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The Affine Wealth Model:
An agent-based model of asset exchange that allows for
negative-wealth agents and its empirical validation∗
Jie Li, Bruce M. Boghosian, and Chengli Li
Department of Mathematics, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts 02155, USA
We present a stochastic, agent-based, binary-transaction Asset-Exchange Model (AEM) for wealth
distribution that allows for agents with negative wealth. This model retains certain features of prior
AEMs such as redistribution and wealth-attained advantage, but it also allows for shifts as well as
scalings of the agent density function. We derive the Fokker-Planck equation describing its time
evolution and we describe its numerical solution, including a methodology for solving the inverse
problem of finding the model parameters that best match empirical data. Using this methodology, we
compare the steady-state solutions of the Fokker-Planck equation with data from the United States
Survey of Consumer Finances over a time period of 27 years. In doing so, we demonstrate agreement
with empirical data of an average error less than 0.16% over this time period. We present the model
parameters for the US wealth distribution data as a function of time under the assumption that
the distribution responds to their variation adiabatically. We argue that the time series of model
parameters thus obtained provides a valuable new diagnostic tool for analyzing wealth inequality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stochastic agent-based Asset-Exchange Models
(AEMs) for wealth distribution were first introduced
in 1986 [1], and first analyzed mathematically using
methods of kinetic theory in 1997 [2]. AEMs are
highly idealized but nonetheless very useful models
for understanding the statics and dynamics of wealth
distributions, and they exhibit a rich phenomenol-
ogy [3, 4]. In this work, we shall demonstrate that,
with appropriate features included, they are also ca-
pable of explaining certain empirical economic data
with remarkable accuracy.
Though there are many variants of AEMs, most
consider a closed economy involving a fixed number
of economic agents, each possessing a certain amount
of a resource, which we shall refer to as wealth. Pairs
of agents are chosen randomly to engage in binary
transactions in which a small amount of wealth, ∆w,
might move from one agent to the other. In the lim-
its of large populations and long times, the agent
density function may be described by a continuous
distribution, either classical or singular in nature.
While such models can be easily simulated using the
Monte Carlo method, in the limit of large numbers
of small transactions – i.e., in the so-called small-
transaction limit – partial differential equations of
Fokker-Planck type [5–7] can be derived for their
agent density functions. These facilitate the study
of the properties of these distributions, both analyt-
ically and by numerical methods.
The present paper is based on a particular AEM
which was first proposed in 2002 [8], and got its
∗ ©2018, all rights reserved
name the Yard-Sale Model (YSM) later in the same
year [9]. This model posits binary transactions
in which ∆w is proportional to the wealth of the
poorer of the two agents, and in which the direction
that the increment of wealth moves is determined
by a fair coin flip. Numerical simulations at the
time indicated that its time-asymptotic state was
one of complete wealth condensation [10, 11], or oli-
garchy, in which all the wealth falls into the hands
of a single agent. In 2014, a Boltzmann equation
was derived for this model, and shown to reduce to
a Fokker-Planck equation in the small-transaction
limit [12, 13]. A year later it was definitively proven
that the time-asymptotic limit of the evolution of
either of these equations, from any initial condition,
was the state of complete oligarchy [14].
In an effort to avert the state of complete oli-
garchy and thereby make the YSM more realistic,
a model of redistribution was introduced whereby
a flat wealth tax χ per unit time was imposed
on all agents on a per-transaction basis, and re-
distributed uniformly to the entire population. It
was shown that this has the effect of adding an
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck [15] term to the Fokker-Planck
equation [13]. A subsequent extension introduced
the idea of Wealth-Attained Advantage (WAA) to
the model, in order to account for the well docu-
mented privileges that wealthier agents enjoy over
poorer agents, such as higher returns on investment
and lower interest rates on loans [16]. Mathemati-
cally, this was accomplished by biasing the coin in
favor of the wealthier agent. The amount of the
bias was taken to be proportional to the difference
in wealth between the richer and poorer agent, times
a coefficient, ζ. Because the bias is proportional to
the wealth difference, it naturally reduces to zero
2when the transacting agents have equal wealth.
The resulting Extended Yard-Sale Model
(EYSM) [16], with redistribution rate χ and WAA
parameter ζ, admits much more interesting phe-
nomenology, which we review in Subsection IIA.
The agent density function is a classical distribution
in the subcritical regime defined by ζ < χ. When
ζ ≥ χ, this passes to a partially wealth-condensed
supercritical regime, characterized by coexistence
between a classical distribution of agents with a
fraction χ/ζ of the total wealth, and an oligarchy
with the remaining 1−χ/ζ of the total wealth [16, 17].
Further study revealed the presence of a “duality”
between the subcritical and supercritical phases of
this extended model [18].
In this paper, we introduce a further modifica-
tion to the EYSM to allow for agents with negative
wealth. Such agents are widely observed in empiri-
cal data – for example, approximately 10.9% of the
population of the United States in 2016 had liabil-
ities in excess of assets, and hence negative wealth
– but most prior AEMs, including the EYSM, have
restricted wealth to be a positive quantity. Realis-
tic models for agent density functions possess invari-
ance properties under scalings of the total number of
agents and the total wealth; we accomplish the ex-
tension to negative wealth by additionally requiring
invariance of the wealth distribution under additive
shifts. Because the new model is invariant under
both scalings and shifts, we refer to it as the Affine
Wealth Model (AWM).
We derive the Fokker-Planck equation obeyed by
the agent density function for the AWM, and we de-
scribe its numerical solution for steady-state wealth
distributions in the subcritical regime (without an
oligarchy). We explain how numerical solutions in
the supercritical regime (with an oligarchy) can be
obtained from their subcritical counterparts by ex-
ploiting the above-mentioned duality [18].
Finally, we present a detailed comparison of the
results of the AWM with empirical data. In partic-
ular, we compare the steady-state solutions of the
Fokker-Planck equation with data from the United
States Survey of Consumer Finances [19] over a time
period of 27 years. In doing so, we demonstrate both
that (i) each of the extensions that we introduced in
the basic AEM resulted in improved fitting, and (ii)
of all these models the AWM is the one most faithful
to the empirical data. Additionally, we present fit-
ting parameters for the U.S. wealth distribution data
as a function of time, under the assumption that the
wealth distribution responds to their changes adia-
batically. We argue that this time series of model pa-
rameters provides a new way to extract useful infor-
mation about wealth inequality in an economy. As
an example, we demonstrate a precisely defined way
of quantifying the extent to which the U.S. wealth
distribution is partially wealth-condensed.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Extended Yard-Sale Model
In this subsection, we provide a brief description
of the Extended Yard-Sale Model (EYSM) on which
the current work is based. A more complete descrip-
tion can be found in a reference [16]. We suppose
that our population has N agents, each with some
positive amount of wealth, and collectively possess-
ing total wealth W , so that the average wealth of
an agent is W/N . We suppose that a specific Agent
1 with wealth w is transacting with a randomly se-
lected Agent 2 with wealth x at time t. In the course
of this transaction, the wealth of Agent 1 is increased
by ∆w, while that of Agent 2 is decreased by ∆w,
so that total wealth is conserved. We suppose that
∆w, which may be either positive or negative, is de-
scribed by the statistical process
∆w =
√
γ∆t min(w, x)η + χ
(
W
N
− w
)
∆t. (1)
The leading term in Eq. (1) is a small propor-
tion of the wealth of the poorer of the two agents,
since it is plausible that most people do not stake
a large fraction of their wealth on a single transac-
tion. Because of this requirement, an agent’s wealth
can never become nonpositive, and the support of
the agent density function is (0,∞). The coin flip
is modeled by the random variable η, which is posi-
tive if the wealth is moving from Agent 2 to Agent 1,
and negative if it is moving from Agent 1 to Agent 2.
We model WAA by supposing that the expectation
value of η is given by
E[η] = ζ
√
∆t
γ
(
w − x
W/N
)
, (2)
where ζ is called the WAA coefficient, so that the
bias in the coin flip is proportional to the difference
in wealth of the two agents, normalized by the av-
erage wealth. Note that if w > x the coin is biased
in favor of wealth going from Agent 2 to Agent 1,
and vice versa. If the two agents have equal wealth,
the above reduces to E[η] = 0 so the coin is unbi-
ased. We can then demand E[η2] = 1 without loss
of generality.
The second term in Eq. (1) implements a flat
wealth tax with rate per unit time equal to χ, which
we call the redistribution coefficient. The amount
of wealth tax collected from Agent 1 in time ∆t is
3(χ∆t)w, so that collected from the entire population
in time ∆t is (χ∆t)W . The latter quantity is divided
by N and redistributed, so the net gain of Agent 1
is precisely the second term in Eq. (1). Note that
agents with wealth less than the mean W/N receive
net benefit from the redistribution, at the expense
of those above the mean. The term is identical to
that in the Fokker-Planck equation for the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process [15], and has the same stabilizing
effect.
A Fokker-Planck equation [5–7] for the agent den-
sity distribution P (w, t) of the above-described ran-
dom process is found by letting ∆t→ 0, which is the
so-called small-transaction limit, and by supposing
that the wealth of Agent 2, namely x, is also a ran-
dom variable. We define the drift coefficient and the
diffusivity by
σ = lim
∆t→0
E
[
∆w
∆t
]
(3)
and
D = lim
∆t→0
E
[
(∆w)2
∆t
]
, (4)
respectively, where the expected value E [f ] of a func-
tion f(η, x) over the distribution P (x, t) is given by
E [f ] = 1
N
∫ ∞
0
dx P (x, t)E[f(η, x)]. (5)
In terms of σ and D, the Fokker-Planck equation
can be written as:
∂P
∂t
= − ∂
∂w
(σP ) +
1
2
∂2
∂w2
(DP ) . (6)
The explicit calculation of σ and D follows
straightforwardly from Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5);
details are given in a reference [16]. The final result
is the nonlinear, partial integrodifferential Fokker-
Planck equation for the EYSM,
∂P
∂t
= − ∂
∂w
[
χ
(
W
N
− w
)
P
]
+
∂
∂w
{
ζ
[
2
N
W
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+ (1− 2L)w
]
P
}
+
∂2
∂w2
[
γ
(
B +
w2
2
A
)
P
]
, (7)
where we have defined the Pareto-Lorenz potentials,
A(w, t) :=
1
N
∫ ∞
w
dx P (x, t) (8)
L(w, t) :=
1
W
∫ w
0
dx P (x, t)x (9)
and
B(w, t) :=
1
N
∫ w
0
dx P (x, t)
x2
2
, (10)
and where the total number of agents and the total
wealth are given in terms of P (w, t) by
N :=
∫ ∞
0
dw P (w, t) (11)
and
W :=
∫ ∞
0
dw P (w, t)w, (12)
respectively. It is straightforward to show that N
and W are constants of the motion of Eq. (7).
We can divide Eq. (7) by γ, absorbing it into
the time t, as well as into the redistribution and
WAA coefficients, χ and ζ, respectively. Equiva-
lently stated, by setting γ to unity we obtain the
form of the equation for natural transactional units
of time t, and we can think of χ and ζ as coeffi-
cients for redistribution and WAA on a per transac-
tion basis, respectively. Hence, with these transac-
tional units adopted, the EYSM is seen to have only
two free parameters.
In steady-state, we set the time derivative to zero
in Eq. (7), and integrate once with respect to w
to obtain the nonlinear, ordinary integrodifferential
equation
d
dw
[(
B +
w2
2
A
)
P
]
= χ
(
W
N
− w
)
P
−2ζ
[
N
W
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+
(
1
2
− L
)
w
]
P. (13)
Henceforth, we focus on the classical and/or weak
solutions of this steady-state equation, and so we
ignore the time dependence, writing P (w) instead
of P (w, t), etc.
B. Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient
Though the agent density function P (w) is very
fundamental, an alternative representation called
the Lorenz curve [20] is widely used for analyzing
wealth distributions. If we know the agent den-
sity function P (w), the Lorenz curve can be ob-
tained by plotting the fraction of total wealth held
by agents with wealth less than w, namely L(w) :=
1
W
∫ w
0 dx P (x)x, versus the fraction of agents with
wealth less than w, namely F (w) := 1
N
∫ w
0
dx P (x),
where N and W are given by Eqs. (11) and (12).
This is a curve in the unit square, parametrized by
the wealth w, that can be shown to be concave up
and lie below the diagonal. Since F (w) increases
4monotonically from 0 to 1, it can be inverted to ob-
tain w = F−1(f) for f on that interval. The func-
tional form of the Lorenz curve is then denoted by
L(f) := L(F−1(f)) for f ∈ [0, 1].
Since zero percent of the agents have zero percent
of the wealth, and one hundred percent of the agents
have one hundred percent of the wealth, one might
reasonably expect that L(0) = 0 and L(1) = 1, as in
Fig. 1a, and, indeed, this is exactly what does hap-
pen when ζ ≤ χ, which we call the subcritical regime.
When ζ > χ, however, it has been shown [16] that
L(1) = χ/ζ < 1, indicative of partial wealth con-
densation, as in Fig. 1b. In essence, a fraction of
1 − χ/ζ of the total wealth is held by a vanishingly
small number of agents, which we refer to as the
oligarchy. Mathematically, this phenomenon is best
understood using the methods of distribution theory
or of nonstandard analysis [21], but we shall eschew
those topics in this presentation.
Since F ′(w) = P (w)/N and L′(w) = P (w)w/W ,
it follows that the slope of the Lorenz curve,
L′(f) =
dL
dw
dF
dw
∣∣∣∣∣
w=F−1(f)
=
F−1(f)
W/N
, (14)
is just the wealth parameter divided by the aver-
age wealth. Hence, as long as all agents have posi-
tive wealth, which is always the case in the EYSM,
the Lorenz curve will be monotonically increasing.
Later, in Sec. III of this paper, we will consider
a model that allows for negative-wealth agents, for
which the Lorenz curve may first decrease from the
point (0, 0) before eventually turning upward.
Given the Lorenz curve as well as N and W , the
distribution P (w) can be recovered. To see how this
is done, first note that if L(f) is known, the deriva-
tive dL
df
can be calculated as a function of f . Since
N andW are additionally known, it follows that the
agent wealth
w =
W
N
dL
df
(15)
is known as a function of f . Because L(f) is concave
up, w will be a monotonically increasing function of
f , so it can be inverted to obtain f = F (w) as a
function of w, which may finally be differentiated
and multiplied by N to obtain P (w) = NF ′(w).
Since we have already noted that {L(f), N,W} can
be computed from P (w), and since we have just
shown that the opposite is also true, it follows that
{L(f), N,W} and P (w) contain equivalent informa-
tion.
For a hypothetical society in which all agents have
exactly the same wealth, it is straightforward to
see that L and F would be equal, so the Lorenz
curve would be a diagonal line. An important mea-
sure of wealth inequality is then the Gini coefficient
G [22, 23], defined to be twice the area between
the Lorenz curve and the diagonal. In the above-
described case of complete economic equality, we
would haveG = 0. In a complete oligarchy, we would
have the degenerate Lorenz curve L(f) = 0 for all
0 ≤ f < 1, so the area between the Lorenz curve and
the diagonal would be 1/2, and hence G = 1. In the
more realistic situation for which the Lorenz curve
lies between these extremes, 0 < G < 1. (With a
sufficiently large number of negative-wealth agents,
however, it is actually possible to have G > 1.) It is
straightforward to show that
G = 1− 2
W
∫ ∞
0
dw P (w)A(w)w. (16)
In the remainder of this paper, instead of trying to
fit model agent density functions to their empirical
counterparts, we will focus on fitting Lorenz curves.
This is more appropriate for a number of reasons,
including
• Lorenz curves and their associated Gini coeffi-
cients are widely used and recognized metrics
for analyzing wealth distributions.
• Empirical agent density functions have non-
compact support in the continuum limit,
whereas the Lorenz curve L(f) is known to
be concave up and, conveniently, supported on
f ∈ [0, 1].
• The supercritical regime, in which wealth is
condensed into a partial or complete oligarchy,
is not easily detectable from the agent den-
sity function, but it is immediately obvious
from inspection of the Lorenz curve. The value
of limf→1− L(f), where the Lorenz curve in-
tersects the right boundary, is the fraction of
wealth held by the non-oligarchical part of the
population.
• Finally, as has been demonstrated, Lorenz
curves contain as much information as agent
density functions that have been scaled so that
N =W = 1. In fact, this scaling is a desirable
normalization when comparing wealth distri-
butions in different countries that may have
very different values of N and W .
C. Symmetries and Duality
Eq. (13) exhibits two remarkable symmetries. We
might anticipate the first of these from our dis-
cussion of the Lorenz curve above. Let’s say that
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(a) Lorenz Curve for subcritical state with classical
wealth density function
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(b) Lorenz Curve for supercritical state with partial
wealth condensation
FIG. 1: In the subcritical case, the Lorenz curve cannot go below zero and always terminates at point (1, 1). The
Gini coefficient is defined to be G = A
A+B
, where A and B are the areas of the shaded regions.
P (w;χ, ζ;W,N) denotes the solution to Eq. (13) for
redistribution coefficient χ, WAA coefficient ζ, to-
tal number of agents N , and total amount of wealth
W . Let’s suppose that we know the Lorenz curve
for this wealth distribution, but we do not know
N and W . In that case, we could make the for-
mal assumption that N = W = 1 and thereby find
P (w;χ, ζ; 1, 1). Then it is readily verified that the
solution to Eq. (13) for other values of N and W is
given by
P (w;χ, ζ;N,W ) =
N
W/N
P
(
w
W/N
;χ, ζ; 1, 1
)
.
(17)
Hence, if Eq. (13) can be solved formally for N =
W = 1, the graph of the solution can be scaled both
horizontally and vertically to obtain the solution for
any N and W whatsoever.
The second symmetry is not at all obvious. It
was derived in a recent reference [18], both from the
steady-state Fokker-Planck equation, Eq. (13), and
from the underlying statistical process. Let
Lsup〈χ,ζ〉(f) := L(F−1(f ;χ, ζ);χ, ζ) (18)
denote a supercritical Lorenz curve function with
redistribution coefficient χ and WAA coefficient ζ >
χ. It follows that swapping χ and ζ will result in a
subcritical Lorenz curve function Lsub〈χ,ζ〉(f). Then it
has been shown that
Lsup〈χ,ζ〉(f) =
χ
ζ
Lsub〈ζ,χ〉(f), (19)
for f ∈ [0, 1), still assuming that ζ > χ.
This establishes a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the subcritical and supercritical states of the
system. This symmetry is an example of the phe-
nomenon of duality, well known in physics. In our
application, duality turns out to be very useful for
numerical computation of the solutions, by elimi-
nating the need to compute supercritical solutions.
If you need to compute a supercritical Lorenz curve,
you can simply compute the subcritical one obtained
by swapping χ and ζ, and then rescale in the man-
ner described above. A more detailed description of
duality can be found in one of the references [18].
III. THE AFFINE WEALTH MODEL
A. Definition of model
A key deficiency of the EYSM is its inability to ac-
count for negative wealth. Agent wealth is initially
positive, and the dynamics keep it so by design, so
the agent density function P is supported on (0,∞).
As noted earlier, however, roughly 10.9% of the pop-
ulation of the United States in 2016 had negative
wealth. To overcome this deficiency, we generalize
the EYSM by demanding a new kind of symmetry.
In addition to the multiplicative scalings described
by Eqs. (17) and (19), we demand invariance under
a certain additive shift of the wealth distribution, to
be described below. Because the new model is in-
variant under both scalings and shifts, we refer to it
as the Affine Wealth Model (AWM).
In the AWM, the agent density function P (w)
is supported on [−∆,∞), where the fixed positive
quantity ∆ will be described shortly. At the begin-
ning of each transaction, the transacting agents both
add ∆ to their wealths. With the positive wealths
6that result, they perform an EYSM transaction. Fi-
nally, they both subtract ∆ from their wealths to
complete the transaction. A nice feature of this ap-
proach is that it is unnecessary to modify the EYSM
algorithm to deal with negative wealth.
Note that, even if both agents begin with positive
wealths, w and x, the quantity
∆w =
√
γ∆t min(w +∆, x+∆)η (20)
may be larger than w and/or x, so that an agent may
lose more wealth than he/she currently possesses,
and thereby end up with negative wealth. The over-
all effect is to create an EYSM distribution in the
“shifted wealth,” w¯ = w + ∆ ∈ (0,∞), but then
to transform that distribution, P¯ (w¯), to be one in
terms of w rather than w¯, which is easily accom-
plished as follows,
P (w) = P¯ (w¯) = P¯ (w +∆), (21)
where P¯ is an EYSM distribution.
Now dw = dw¯, so it follows that
N =
∫ ∞
−∆
dw P (w) =
∫ ∞
0
dw¯ P¯ (w¯) = N¯ (22)
and
W =
∫ ∞
−∆
dw P (w)w
=
∫ ∞
0
dw¯ P¯ (w¯)(w¯ −∆) = W¯ −∆N¯ , (23)
and hence the average wealth, µ :=W/N is given in
terms of the shifted average wealth, µ¯ := W¯/N¯ , by
µ = µ¯−∆. (24)
Going forward, we write ∆ as a fraction of the shifted
average wealth, µ¯, which is guaranteed to be posi-
tive, ∆ = κµ¯, where κ ≥ 0 is a new parameter of the
model. It follows that µ = (1− κ)µ¯, and hence
∆ = λµ = κµ¯, (25)
where we have defined
λ :=
κ
1− κ (26)
for convenience. While there is nothing preventing
κ from exceeding one in principle, we shall see that
empirically determined values of κ tend to be very
small.
In similar fashion, we can compute the Lorenz-
Pareto potentials, F , A, L and B, in terms of their
barred counterparts as follows:
F (w) = F¯ (w¯) (27)
A(w) = A¯(w¯) (28)
L(w) = (1 + λ)L¯(w¯)− λF¯ (w¯) (29)
B(w) = B¯(w¯)− κµ¯2
[
L¯(w¯)− κF¯ (w¯)
2
]
. (30)
The corresponding inverse transformations are then
F¯ (w¯) = F (w) (31)
A¯(w¯) = A(w) (32)
L¯(w¯) = (1− κ)L(w) + κF (w) (33)
B¯(w¯) = B(w) + λµ2
[
L(w) + λ
F (w)
2
]
. (34)
Note that the transformation reduces to the identity
when κ = λ = 0.
B. Fokker-Planck equation for AWM
With the above transformations in hand, and
restoring the time dependence of P for a moment,
we wish to derive the Fokker-Planck equation for
the AWM. We do this by supposing that the shifted
wealth distribution is the result of an EYSM, so that
P¯ and its associated barred Pareto-Lorenz potentials
should obey a version of Eq. (7).
We begin by writing Eq. (1) for the AWM,
∆w¯ =
√
γ∆t min(w¯, x¯)η + χ (µ¯− w¯)∆t. (35)
Note that
µ¯− w¯ = (µ+∆)− (w +∆) = µ− w, (36)
so that the redistribution term is invariant under the
shift.
Next, we wish to modify Eq. (2). Clearly w¯− x¯ =
w−x, so the numerator of the fraction in parentheses
in that equation is invariant. In the denominator,
we use W¯/N¯ since that is guaranteed to be positive.
The modified version of Eq. (2) for the AWM is then
E[η] = ζ
√
∆t
γ
(
w¯ − x¯
µ¯
)
. (37)
Since Eqs. (35) and (37) are identical to Eqs. (1)
and (2) but for the presence of the bars, the equation
obeyed by P¯ is
∂P¯
∂t
+
∂
∂w¯
{
χ (µ¯− w¯) P¯
−ζ
[
2
µ¯
(
B¯ − w¯
2
2
A¯
)
+
(
1− 2L¯) w¯] P¯}
=
∂2
∂w¯2
[
γ
(
B¯ +
w¯2
2
A¯
)
P¯
]
. (38)
We now insert the transformation described in
Eqs. (21)–(26), and Eqs. (31)–(34) of Subsec-
tion IIIA to obtain, after some calculation, the
Fokker-Planck equation for the AWM,
7∂P
∂t
+
∂
∂w
{
(χ− κζ) (µ− w)P − (1− κ)ζ
[
2
µ
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+ (1− 2L)w
]
P
}
=
∂2
∂w2
{
γ
[(
B +
w2
2
A
)
+ λµ (µL+Aw) +
λ2µ2
2
]
P
}
. (39)
where w ∈ [−λµ,∞).
The equation for the steady-state agent density
function can be derived by setting ∂P
∂t
= 0 and inte-
grating once with respect to w to obtain
d
dw
{
γ
[(
B +
w2
2
A
)
+ λµ (µL+Aw) +
λ2µ2
2
]
P
}
= (χ− κζ) (µ− w)P − (1 − κ)ζ
[
2
µ
(
B − w
2
2
A
)
+ (1− 2L)w
]
P, (40)
again for w ∈ [−λµ,∞).
Eqs. (39) and (40) are one-parameter deforma-
tions of Eqs. (7) and (13), respectively. The former
reduce to the latter when κ (and hence λ = κ1−κ )
is set to zero. Though the deformed equations ap-
pear more complicated, they have the same basic
structure – namely a transaction term, a redistribu-
tion term and a WAA term. Furthermore, the WAA
term and the redistribution term of Eqs. (39) and
(40) have the exact same form as those in Eqs. (7)
and (13) but with two interesting changes: First, the
WAA coefficient is scaled by 1−κ; second, the redis-
tribution rate χ is effectively reduced by κζ. For the
first observation, we need κ < 1 to keep the scaled
WAA coefficient positive. From Eq. (25), this is also
equivalent to having a positive mean wealth µ. As
will be shown later in Subsections IVD and IVE,
empirical fittings suggest that reasonable values of
κ are all far less than one. The effect of a nega-
tive WAA coefficient on the solution to the differ-
ential equation is a mathematical question out of
the scope of this paper. For the second observa-
tion, we need χ > κζ to keep the reduced redis-
tribution coefficient positive. As will be shown in
Eq. (48), given that κ < 1, this is also equivalent to
the Lorenz curve intersecting its right-hand bound-
ary at a positive value, so that the wealth held by the
non-oligarchical population is positive. Again, em-
pirical evidence presented later will show that this
inequality is always satisfied by a large margin in
reality, and we leave the case when it is violated as
a mathematical question for future study. Our cur-
rent intuition is that this may cause an instability or
even non-existence of the solution to the differential
equation.
C. Lorenz curve and duality for the AWM
To better understand the nature of the shift
invariance, denote solutions to Eq. (40) by
P (w;χ, ζ, κ;W,N) for w ∈ [−λµ,∞). From the con-
struction of Eq. (40), it is clear that the shifted den-
sity function P¯ , obeys the Fokker-Planck equation
for the EYSM, Eq. (38), which is the same as that
for the AWM when κ = 0. It follows that we have
the new symmetry
P (w;χ, ζ, κ;W,N) = P (w+λµ;χ, ζ, 0; (1+λ)W,N),
(41)
and so it is possible to solve the Fokker-Planck equa-
tion for the AWM by solving the much simpler ver-
sion for the EYSM and shifting the result.
The above observation gives us a complete strat-
egy for solving for the agent density function for the
AWM. When asked to find P (w;χ, ζ, κ;W,N) for
w ∈ [−λµ,∞):
1. Use Eq. (41) to transform it to a problem for
which κ = 0 and w ∈ [0,∞).
2. If ζ > χ so that the problem is supercritical,
use Eq. (19) to transform it to a subcritical
one.
3. Finally, use Eq. (17) to transform the problem
to one in so-called canonical form, for which
N =W = 1.
Hence, the only numerical solutions needed for solv-
ing the AWM are subcritical, canonical-form solu-
tions for the EYSM.
We can go one step further and directly relate
the Lorenz curves of the three stages of the above
strategy. We first consider the subcritical case, for
8which Step 2 is unnecessary. Moreover, we can sup-
pose that we start in canonical form, so that Step
3 is unnecessary. We again denote the Lorenz curve
of the subcritical AWM with redistribution coeffi-
cient χ and WAA coefficient ζ < χ by Lsub〈χ,ζ〉(f) =
L(F−1(f)), and that of the corresponding EYSM
solution by L¯sub〈χ,ζ〉(f) = L¯(F¯−1(f)). Then, using
Eqs. (27) and (29), we have
Lsub〈χ,ζ〉(f) = L(F−1(f))
= L(F¯−1(f))
= (1 + λ)L¯(F¯−1(f))− λF¯ (F¯−1(f)),
or
Lsub〈χ,ζ〉(f) = (1 + λ)L
sub
〈χ,ζ〉(f)− λf, (42)
which directly relates the Lorenz curve of the sub-
critical AWM to that of the corresponding EYSM.
Note that
Lsub〈χ,ζ〉(0) = (1 + λ)0 − λ0 = 0 (43)
and
Lsub〈χ,ζ〉(1) = (1 + λ)1 − λ1 = 1, (44)
as expected.
We next consider the supercritical case in which
ζ > χ, again using the canonical form so that Step
3 is unnecessary. A line of reasoning similar to that
above yields
Lsup〈χ,ζ〉(f) = (1 + λ)L
sup
〈χ,ζ〉(f)− λf. (45)
We can now use Eq. (19) to rewrite this as
Lsup〈χ,ζ〉(f) = (1 + λ)
χ
ζ
Lsub〈ζ,χ〉(f)− λf, (46)
It still follows that
Lsup〈χ,ζ〉(0) = 0, (47)
but now we have
Lsup〈χ,ζ〉(1) = (1 + λ)
χ
ζ
− λ (48)
for the fraction of wealth held by the non-oligarchical
part of the population, and
1− Lsup〈χ,ζ〉(1) = (1 + λ)
(
1− χ
ζ
)
(49)
for the fraction of wealth held by the oligarchy.
Notice that, given κ < 1, Lsup〈χ,ζ〉(1) > 0 is equiv-
alent to χ > κζ, and this is the condition we have
discussed in subsection III B.
Using the methodology described in this subsec-
tion, we can plot the Lorenz curve for the AWM
for any given parameter triplet 〈χ, ζ, κ〉 by applying
transformations to Lorenz curves for subcritical solu-
tions of the EYSM. This observation enormously fa-
cilitated obtaining the fitting results presented later
in this paper. Examples of subcritical and super-
critical Lorenz curves for the AWM with negative-
wealth agents are presented in Figs. 2a and 2b.
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS
A. Description of data used
The data we used for the U.S. wealth distribu-
tion was taken from the U.S. Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) conducted by the Federal Reserve
Board in cooperation with the U.S. Department of
the Treasury [19]. It is a triennial cross-sectional
survey of U.S. families, which includes information
on families’ balance sheets, pensions, income, and
demographic characteristics.
Among the data fields collected for the households
surveyed in the SCF is one called networth, which
represents the total wealth of a household 1 Because
networth is calculated as the difference between as-
sets and liabilities, its value can be negative. Indeed,
as noted earlier, about 10.9% of the U.S. population
has negative net wealth, and so the Lorenz curve for
the U.S. actually does dip below zero, as described
in Subsection III C.
In the remainder of this section, we will compare
several different models with empirical data from the
SCF. Of these models, only the AWM is capable of
producing a Lorenz curve with negative values. For
the other models considered, there will necessarily be
a significant error at low wealth, where the Lorenz
curve of the model is positive, but that of the data
is negative.
For reasons of confidentiality, the published SCF
data intentionally excluded people listed on the so-
called “Forbes 400” list of the wealthiest people in
the U.S. [24]. Because this group of people, though
small in number, are so wealthy as to have a nonneg-
ligible impact of the overall distribution especially in
the upper tail, we felt it important to add them back
1 Technically, networth is not contained in the original mi-
crodata of the SCF. Users of SCF data must calculate it
themselves by summing over a number of other financial
variables that are among the microdata. In fact, an exam-
ple explaining how to do exactly this is provided with the
SCF data [19], and we followed this example closely when
preparing the data for this study.
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(a) Lorenz Curve for AWM subcritical state with neg-
ative wealth
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(b) Lorenz Curve for AWM supercritical state with
negative wealth
FIG. 2: In the subcritical case, the Lorenz curve dips below zero but terminates at point (1, 1). The Gini coefficient
is defined to be G = A
A+B
, where A and B are the areas of the shaded region. With our AWM and in empirical
wealth distributions, the Lorenz curve can: 1, go negative due to the existence of agents with negative total wealth;
2, hit the right boundary somewhere below point (1,1) due to the existence of oligarchy. The Gini coefficient in this
case is define to be G = A−C
A+B−C
, where A, B and C are the areas of the shaded regions.
into the SCF data. Fortunately, the journal Forbes
publishes this list of people on an annual basis, in-
cluding an estimate of their net wealth, so we simply
merged the Forbes 400 dataset with the SCF dataset
and used their union to conduct our analyses. We
checked the resulting dataset by using Eq. (16) to
calculate the wealth Gini coefficient, and comparing
that to published values; for example, for the 2013
SCF data, we calculated a Gini coefficient of 85.5%,
which is very close to that was reported (85.1%) in
the “Global Wealth Databook,” published by Credit
Suisse in 2013 [25].
The empirical wealth distribution obtained in the
manner described above is discretized by groups of
households. The jth such group is represented as
having net wealth wj , and weight pj. The weights
pj are presumably proportional to the number of
households in each group, and are normalized over
the population so that
∑
j pj = 1. The density func-
tion of the wealth can therefore be written as a sum
of weighted Dirac delta distributions,
P (w) =
N∑
j=1
pjδ(w − wj). (50)
It is clear that N =
∫
dw P (w) =
∑
j pj = 1, and
W =
∫
dw P (w)w =
∑
j pjwj . The wj can all be
uniformly scaled so that this last quantity is also
equal to one, so that the empirical data is in canon-
ical form, with N =W = 1.
To plot the Lorenz ordinates, we need to com-
pute the cumulative sum of the population with
wealth less than w and their corresponding cumula-
tive wealth. This is equivalent to plotting the points
(fj , ℓj), where
fj :=
∑
i :wi≤wj
pi (51)
and
ℓj :=
∑
i :wi≤wj
piwi. (52)
The empirical Lorenz curve to which we compare
our models in this paper is a linear interpolation of
the Lorenz ordinates (fj , ℓj), described above. Since
SCF data is very fine, including tens of thousands of
households, the interpolation appears as a smooth
curve, as does the numerical solution to our theoret-
ical model.
B. Fitting method
The fitting was done by minimizing the L1 norm
of the difference between the empirical Lorenz curve
and the theoretical Lorenz curve obtained by numer-
ical solution of our models. Consistent with notation
we have already adopted above, if a model’s param-
eters are the components of a parameter vector θ, we
shall write Lθ(f) for the theoretical (model) Lorenz
curve corresponding to that parameter vector. If
we then write L(f) for the empirical Lorenz curve,
10
our fitting methodology can be described mathemat-
ically as
θoptimal = argmin
θ
J(θ), (53)
where we have defined the discrepancy
J(θ) :=
∫ 1
0
df |L(f)− Lθ(f)| (54)
The choice of the L1 norm here is inspired by the
definition of Gini coefficient; just as the Gini coeffi-
cient is half the area between the Lorenz curve and
the diagonal, the discrepancy is equal to the area be-
tween the theoretical and empirical Lorenz curves.
The parameter vector θ will have different dimen-
sions for different models. In what follows, we shall
consider models with between one and three pa-
rameters, so the dimension of θ ranges from one to
three. These models are described in detail in Sub-
section IVC. In all cases, there are no guarantees
for the concavity of J(θ) and therefore we employ
a global numerical search for the optimal parame-
ter(s).
For some of the results presented in Subsec-
tion IVE, the model and empirical Lorenz curves
are so close that it is difficult to distinguish them
graphically. For this reason, we display the local er-
ror between the two curves, plotted versus F , in an
inset to each of the figures presented. Since the slope
of the Lorenz curve ranges from zero (or slightly less)
to infinity, defining the local error as the vertical dis-
tance between the two curves would be misleading.
Instead, we define the local error as the length of
a line segment connecting the empirical data point
(fj , ℓj) to the model Lorenz curve, constructed so
as to be perpendicular to the latter, as shown in
Fig. 3. If there is more than one such line segment,
the length of the shortest is used. In other words,
the local error is the shortest distance from the em-
pirical data point to the model Lorenz curve.
For model Lorenz curves in the supercritical
regime, when L is greater than the fraction of wealth
held by the non-oligarchical population and less than
one, the solution will coincide with the boundary
f = 1. A line segment perpendicular to this part
of the model Lorenz curve is, therefore, horizontal,
so the local error is the horizontal distance from the
point (fj , ℓj) to the vertical boundary f = 1, i.e., it
is equal to |fj − 1|. This is also shown in Fig. 3.
C. Description of models used
1. Single-agent model
As a baseline for our comparisons, we use a lin-
ear model similar to one employed in earlier work
F
L
Fitting to Lorenz curve
(fi, li)
(Fi, Li)
(fj, lj) (1, Lj)
FIG. 3: Geometry of computing the local errors for
the data points (fi, ℓi) and (fj , ℓj) to the fitting
curve L(f). For (fi, ℓi), we compute its perpendic-
ular distance to the point (f,Lθ(f)), which is the
closest point on Lθ(f). While for (fj , ℓj), we com-
pute its horizontal distance to the boundary f = 1.
by a number of authors. (See, e.g., [10]). Instead
of randomly selecting pairs of agents to engage in
binary transactions, the model selects single agents
to engage in unary transactions. For this reason,
we henceforth refer to it as the Single-Agent Model
(SAM). In a transaction, an agent with wealth w has
even odds of winning or losing a fraction
√
γ∆t of
his/her own wealth. If we again employ a redistribu-
tion term of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck form, as in Eq. (1),
the analog of that equation is
∆w =
√
γ∆t wη + χ
(
W
N
− w
)
∆t. (55)
where E[η] = 0 and E[η2] = 1. This statistical pro-
cess obviously conserves the total number of agents,
but it conserves wealth only in a mean sense. The
easily derived linear Fokker-Planck equation corre-
sponding to this model,
∂P (w, t)
∂t
= − ∂
∂w
[
χ
(
W
N
− w
)
P (w, t)
]
+
∂2
∂w2
[
γ
w2
2
P (w, t)
]
, (56)
however, conserves both N and W . In the same
spirit as our derivations of Eqs. (13) and (40), we
see that the steady-state solutions of Eq. (56) are
described by
d
dw
[
w2
2
P (w)
]
= χ
(
W
N
− w
)
P (w), (57)
which can be solved analytically. If the constant of
integration is chosen to satisfy the normalization re-
quirement of Eq. (11), and if we adopt transactional
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units by taking γ = 1 as before, the result for the
agent density function is
P (w) =
N
µ
(2χ)2χ
Γ(2χ)
( µ
w
)2χ+2
e−2χ
µ
w , (58)
where µ := W/N is the mean wealth. Notice that
near w = 0 this solution for P (w) is very flat and
depleted, while for w very large, it is asymptoti-
cally a power-law consistent with the observations
of Pareto.
From Eq. (58), it is straightforward to calculate
F (w) = Q
(
2χ+ 1,
2χµ
w
)
(59)
and
L(w) = Q
(
2χ,
2χµ
w
)
, (60)
where Q := Γ(a,z)Γ(a) is the regularized upper in-
complete gamma function. The inverse of this
function is typically denoted by Q−1(a, z), so that
Q(a,Q−1(a, z)) = z, in terms of which the one-
parameter Lorenz curve function is
LSAM〈χ〉 (f) = Q
(
2χ,Q−1 (2χ+ 1, f)
)
(61)
Note that the parameter vector for this model, θ =
〈χ〉, is one-dimensional since the Lorenz curve de-
pends only on the redistribution coeffiient χ.
2. EYSM with redistribution
The second model that we consider is the EYSM
as described in Subsection IIA, with redistribution
coefficient χ, but without WAA so ζ = 0. Again, the
parameter vector is one-dimensional, and we denote
the functional form of the Lorenz curve by LEYSM〈χ〉 (f).
3. EYSM with redistribution & WAA
The third model that we consider is the EYSM as
described in Subsection II A, but this time with both
redistribution coefficient χ, and WAA coefficient ζ.
The parameter vector is therefore two-dimensional,
and we denote the functional form of the Lorenz
curve by LEYSM〈χ,ζ〉 (f).
4. AWM
The fourth model that we consider is the AWM as
described in Sec. III. The parameter vector for that
model is three-dimensional, θ = 〈χ, ζ, κ〉, and from
the discussion in Subsection III C, we know that we
can write
LAWM〈χ,ζ,κ〉(f) = (1 + λ)LEYSMχ,ζ (f)− λf, (62)
where it should be recalled that λ is given by
Eq. (26).
Now a global search in a three-dimensional pa-
rameter space would be computationally expensive.
Notice, however, that if we were using the L2 norm
to define the discrepancy instead of the L1 norm,
and if χ and ζ were held fixed, the optimal value of
λ would be given by
λL2opt =
∫ 1
0
df
[
LEYSM〈χ,ζ〉 (f)− ℓ(f)
] [
f − LEYSM〈χ,ζ〉 (f)
]
∫ 1
0 df
[
f − LEYSM〈χ,ζ〉 (f)
]2 ,
(63)
where ℓ(f) is the empirical Lorenz curve. From this
we could compute
κL2opt =
λL2opt
1 + λL2opt
. (64)
In our numerical simulations, we used κL2opt as the
initial guess in a line search for the true optimal
value κL1opt, obtained by minimizing the L1 norm of
the discrepancy.
In the above-described fashion, a three-
dimensional optimization problem is reduced
to a two-dimensional one in 〈χ, ζ〉 – albeit with
a quick line search at each point, for which we
have an excellent initial guess. We have found this
method to work reliably and significantly reduce
the computational work involved.
D. Comparison of models
In this subsection, we apply the fitting technique
of Subsection IVB to all four models described in
Subsection IVC. For this purpose, we use the 2013
SCF data, including the Forbes 400, as described
in Subsection IVA. All the fitting results are shown
in Fig. (4), and all the optimal parameters found
as well as the comparisons between the fitting Ginis
and the empirical Gini are summarized in Table.(I)
Fig. (4a) shows a fitting to the SCF data for the
baseline SAM model. Although the Gini coefficient
of the fitting curve is close to the empirical Gini, the
discrepancy between the two curves clearly leaves
something to be desired. The fit suggests that the
SAM is unable to capture the behavior of the actual
Lorenz curve both in the lower-wealth region and in
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(c) EYSM with redistribution and WAA
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(d) Affine Wealth Model
FIG. 4: Fits of four different models to the empirical Lorenz Curve for the 2013 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances
data, with the addition of the Forbes 400. For each fit, we searched for the optimal parameter vector that minimizes
the L1 norm between the empirical and model Lorenz curves. The local error plotted in the inset was computed
as described in Subsection IVB. The four fits demonstrate increasing improvement in their ability to fit empirical
data, in the order of their presentation. The fit for the AWM, introduced in this paper, is superior to the other
three models in its ability to capture the characteristics of the wealth distribution both in the lower-wealth region
(including negative wealth) as well as in the the upper tail.
the upper tail. It seriously overestimates the Lorenz
curve in the lower-wealth region, far beyond what
can be explained by that fact that it does not allow
for negative wealth. Moreover, the SAM’s asymptot-
ically power-law tail is seen to badly underestimate
the empirical upper tail. The local error incurred,
plotted in the inset, has an average in the vicinity of
2%.
Fig. (4b) shows the fitting to the SCF data for the
EYSM with redistribution only, as described in Sub-
section IIA. This is the simplest nonlinear, binary-
transaction model that we considered that gives a
stable distribution. Even though there is only a sin-
gle parameter in this model, namely the redistribu-
tion χ, just as there was in the SAM, the extent
to which the fit has improved throughout the entire
range of f is remarkable. This suggests that nonlin-
ear models with binary transactions have large ad-
vantages over linear models. Once again, the largest
local error occurs in the low-wealth region, but this
time it may well be due to the fact that the model
does not allow for negative wealth.
Fig. (4c) shows the fit to the 2013 SCF data for
the EYSM with both redistribution andWAA, as de-
scribed in Subsection IIA. Recall that this model is
capable of wealth condensation. The result clearly
demonstrates that the best fit to the data lies in
the supercritical regime, suggesting that the U.S.
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wealth distribution at that time was oligarchical,
with 8.33% of the total wealth of the country held
by a vanishingly small number of agents. Note that
the upper tail of the fit is significantly improved, as
compared to the two previous fits. Still, the EYSM
does not allow for negative wealth, and hence there
is still a large discrepancy in the lower-wealth region.
Finally, Fig. (4d) shows the fitting to the 2013
SCF data for the AWM. Even a glance at the figure
is sufficient to tell that the AWM is better than any
of the other three models considered. Of course, it
has more parameters than the others, but three pa-
rameters does not seem like a high price to pay for
this kind of faithfulness to empirical data. Because
the AWM allows for negative wealth, it is able to
capture what is happening in the low-wealth region
of the Lorenz curve, yet without losing its accuracy
in the upper tail. The model and empirical curves
lie nearly on top of one another, the discrepancy is
reduced by nearly an order of magnitude compared
with the other fits, and the average local error is re-
duced to about only one tenth percent. In summary,
we feel that the AWM has provided a reasonable way
to extend the EYSM to the negative wealth regime,
enabling the accurate quantitative modeling of em-
pirical data.
E. Results for SCF from 1989 to 2016
Having established the superiority of the AWM
over the other three models considered in Subsec-
tion IVD, we henceforth restrict our attention to
the AWM and examine empirical data from the SCF
over the course of time. The SCF has been con-
ducted in three years intervals, from 1989 to 2016,
so there are ten plots in total. For each of these ten
datasets, we solve the “inverse problem” of finding
the AWM parameter vector θ = 〈χ, ζ, κ〉 that min-
imizes the L1 norm of the difference between the
empirical and model Lorenz curves.
The results of the fits are shown in Fig. 5, and all
the optimal parameters found as well as comparisons
between the fitting Ginis and the empirical Ginis
are summarized in Table.(II). For each year consid-
ered, we report the best fittings as well as the opti-
mal parameters. The plots indicate that the AWM
fits to the empirical data remarkably well. For all
the three-parameter fits, the empirical and model
Lorenz curves are nearly indistinguishable, and av-
erage local errors are in the vicinity of 0.15%. One
key observation is that all fits fall into the supercrit-
ical regime with χ < ζ. Therefore the Lorenz curves
computed from the numerical solutions all hit the
right boundary at ((1 + λ)χ/ζ − λ, 1), as described
in Eq.( 48), instead of at (1, 1). The horizontal dot-
ted lines indicate where the Lorenz curves hit the
boundary, and the model Lorenz curve is a vertical
line above this point. This strongly suggests that the
U.S. wealth distribution has been in a state of partial
wealth condensation – or partial oligarchy – for all
the years of the SCF. The fraction of the total soci-
etal wealth held by the oligarchy is (1+λ) (1− χ/ζ),
by Eq. (49). From the plots, we can see that, this
fraction is in the vicinity of 20% to 30%.
The ten Lorenz curves from the different years ap-
pear very similar to one another, but the fitting pa-
rameters vary from year to year. Since each AWM
fitting curve is entirely determined by the three
model parameters, we can study the trend of the
U.S. wealth distribution over time by plotting these
optimal values of the parameters versus time.
It should be kept in mind that all of our fits are
to steady-state Lorenz curves of the AWM. In plot-
ting the AWM fitting parameters versus time, we
are therefore supposing that their time variation is
adiabatic in nature; in other words, we suppose that
the variation of the fitting parameters is too slow to
induce the ∂P
∂t
term in the Fokker-Planck equation
to make any significant contribution.
In Fig. (6a), we plot the optimal values of the
three parameters 〈χ, ζ, κ〉 of the AWM, correspond-
ing to the ten Lorenz curves plotted in Fig. (5) as
a functions of time. As mentioned earlier, we can
confirm that χ < ζ throughout this entire period, so
the U.S. wealth distribution was oligarchical during
the entire 27-year period of the study. It should be
pointed out that by “oligarchical” here, we mean a
very precise thing: In the space of all valid (classical
and distributional) solutions to our Fokker-Planck
equation, Eq. (39), those solutions closest to the
SCF data (in the sense that the L1 norm of the
discrepancy is smallest) are all distributional solu-
tions exhibiting wealth condensation, i.e., for which
limf→1− L(f) < 1. This gives a mathematically pre-
cise definition of the phenomenon of oligarchy.
A second feature we can observe from Fig. (6a) is
that κ is much less variable than either χ or ζ. Hence
the ratio of the lower extreme of the negative-wealth
region to the average wealth is relatively constant
over the years.
A third feature that is evident from the plot of the
parameters versus time is that there seems to be a
correlation between χ and ζ. This may be because
these two parameters are, at least to some extent,
redundant in their effect on the agent density func-
tion. Increasing WAA is similar (though certainly
not identical) in effect to decreasing redistribution.
Hence, an increase in ζ can be mitigated to some ex-
tent by a simultaneous increase in χ. It is therefore
perhaps not surprising that the ratio of these two
parameters, χ/ζ, is more robust than either one in-
14
Models χopt ζopt κopt Fitting
Gini
Empirical
Gini
Single Agent Model 0.0066 - - 83.29%
85.50%
EYSM w/ redist. 0.016 - - 83.85%
EYSM w/ redist. & WAA 0.022 0.024 - 83.76%
Affine Wealth Model 0.046 0.064 0.076 85.59%
TABLE I: Optimal values of the parameters and fitted Ginis found for each model in Fig. 4
Years χopt ζopt κopt Fitting
Gini
Empirical
Gini
fraction of wealth
held by oligarch
1989 0.088 0.112 0.092 79.17% 78.96% 23.60%
1992 0.102 0.134 0.100 78.72% 78.59% 26.53%
1995 0.104 0.146 0.096 79.27% 79.06% 31.82%
1998 0.096 0.134 0.098 80.20% 79.99% 31.44%
2001 0.074 0.100 0.080 80.86% 80.54% 28.26%
2004 0.070 0.092 0.080 81.07% 80.92% 25.99%
2007 0.070 0.100 0.076 81.81% 81.61% 32.47%
2010 0.046 0.058 0.076 84.59% 84.56% 22.39%
2013 0.048 0.066 0.078 85.24% 85.05% 29.58%
2016 0.036 0.050 0.058 86.18% 85.94% 29.72%
TABLE II: Optimal values of the parameters and fitted Ginis found for each year in Fig. 5
dividually. Since both χ/ζ and κ are reasonably con-
stant, from Eq. (49) one would expect the oligarchy
wealth fraction to be likewise, and this is verified
by the lowest curve in Fig. (6b), which indicates an
oligarchy wealth fraction of between 20% and 30%
over the course of the study.
The upper curves in Fig (6b) are plots of the
empirical and model Gini coefficients. It is unsur-
prising that these two curves are nearly identical,
given the accuracy of our Lorenz curve fits. Over
the 27-year time period of the study, the Gini coef-
ficient has increased from 79% to 86%. This is con-
sistent with figures published by leading economic
institutes [25, 26].
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The AWM, described in this work, provides a
new model of wealth distribution that is able to
describe empirical data with unprecedented accu-
racy. Because the model’s parameters are related
to specific features of its agent-level description, the
trends of these parameters in time, as shown for ex-
ample in Fig. (6), enable us to glimpse underlying
mechanisms for wealth distribution evolution. The
AWM thereby, at least to some extent, bridges the
gap between microeconomics and macroeconomics.
The economic turbulence of 2008, for example, is
clearly reflected in a sharp downward movement of
the agent-level parameters χ and ζ, accompanied by
a pronounced upward movement in the Gini coeffi-
cient – the latter arguably being a macroeconomic
indicator. For all of the above reasons, we feel that
the approach shows great promise, though we ac-
knowledge that a precise relationship between the
AWM model parameters and more conventional eco-
nomic indicators will probably require the involve-
ment of economists, political scientists and public
policy specialists to sort out.
Another observation that warrants future study
is the nature of the tail of the agent density func-
tion, P (w). It has been demonstrated that the non-
oligarchical part of the EYSM agent density func-
tion for positive χ and nonnegative ζ has a gaussian
tail [16, 27]. This seems at least somewhat at odds
with – if not in outright contradiction to – the con-
ventionally held belief, dating back to Pareto [28],
that wealth distributions have power-law tails. We
feel that there are a number of good reasons to ques-
tion this conventional belief. First, while there seems
to be solid empirical evidence for a power-law tail for
income distributions [3], much less work has been
done for wealth distributions, perhaps owing to the
relative paucity of available data 2. Second, while
the tail of EYSM distributions is always gaussian,
the midrange in the limit of small χ has been shown
(albeit only for the case ζ = 0) to be nearly power-
law in nature [27]. Since our fitted values of χ are
in the vicinity of 4% to 10%, this suggests that it
2 As of this writing, only about twenty countries in the world
directly collect wealth data on their household surveys.
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FIG. 5: Continues on next page
is probably very easy to confuse EYSM distribu-
tions with power laws, especially if most of one’s
data is in the midrange – as is obviously always the
case. Third, we have shown that it is mathemati-
cally important to separate the oligarchy, which is
best described by distribution theory or by nonstan-
dard analysis in the continuum limit [21], from the
tail of the classical part of the agent density func-
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FIG. 5: Optimal fits of the AWM to SCF data from 1989 to 2016. For each year, we determined the parameter
triplet 〈χ, ζ, κ〉 that minimizes the L1 norm of the difference between the empirical and model Lorenz curves. Our
results demonstrate that the AWM fits the empirical data remarkably well for all ten datasets. All the fits are in
the supercritical regime, which strongly suggests that U.S. wealth distribution is partially wealth-condensed; i.e., a
finite fraction of the total wealth of the society is held by an infinitesimal fraction of the agents. This fraction can
be estimated by Eq. (49), which was consistently in the vicinity of 30% for all the years of the study.
tion, since conflating these will make the the tail
seem longer than it really is. This requires delicate
numerical analysis which no prior work would have
had the motivation to adopt. Because the accuracy
of our fits in Fig. 5 speak for themselves, we believe
that it is time to take a fresh look at the actual
empirical evidence underlying the long-held belief in
power-law tails of wealth distributions.
There is ample room for future work in this area.
As mentioned earlier, our fits of the empirical data
were made to steady-state solutions of the Fokker-
Planck equation for the AWM, Eq. (40). Yet the
optimal model parameters 〈χ, ζ, κ〉 found and plot-
ted in Fig. 6 are changing in time. This is no
doubt because levels of redistribution, WAA and ex-
treme poverty, respectively, change in time due to
public policy and political decisions. Our approach
is nonetheless valid under the assumption that the
changes in these parameters are slow enough to be
adiabatic in nature – i.e., not rapid enough for the
time derivative, ∂P
∂t
, to become appreciable. Still, fu-
ture work might focus on taking the time evolution
into account. For this purpose, a more sophisticated
fit would be necessary, including time as an indepen-
dent variable, and fitting to a parameter vector that
is a function of time, probably with some smooth-
ness conditions. This would be a much more difficult
fit, and we leave it to future work.
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FIG. 6: Since the fitting curves are completely determined by the three parameters of the AWM, the change in
wealth distribution over time can be summarized by plotting optimal values of these parameters found as a function
of time, under the presumption that they change adiabatically. Our plots demonstrate a correlation between the
redistribution parameter χ and the WAA parameter ζ. The affine transformation coefficient κ is less variable than
the other two parameters which suggests that the ratio of the lower extreme of the negative-wealth region to the
average wealth is relatively stable over the years. The Gini coefficient of the model data is also very close to that of
the empirical data. The fraction of the wealth held by the oligarch can be computed by Eq. (49), and it is shown
that this ratio is relatively stable within the range of 20% to 30%.
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